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THE WELSH OUTLOOK The Editor does not necessarily identify himself with the opinions of contributors to "The Welsh Outlook." Editorial responsilility is limited to the views expressed in the Notes of the Month." NOTES OF THE MONTH The German The much advertised German offensive Offensive is now in full swing. There have been two main attacks which disclose the objectives of the enemy's High Command. The first blow, aimed at the junction of the British and French Armies, was intended to drive a wedge between us and our Allies, and, by seizing Amiens and Abbeville, to destroy the communications between our base at Havre and our Armies in the North. Had Ludendorff been able to achieve this result he would have separated the Allied forces and he would then have dealt with them both in detail. No doubt he intended, by hurling overwhelming forces against the British north of the Somme, to drive us back on the channel ports, and thus to destroy the British Army, leaving the French to be dealt with later. The impetus of the first rush, overwhelming the 5th Army, had spent itself before the Germans were able to reach Amiens. Allied Reserves were rushed up and the gap was closed before the enemy was able to exploit his initial success and turn it to a decisive victory. It is true he overran the devastated country, through which he retired last year, and over this wilderness he found it increasingly difficult to bring up his supplies, munitions and big guns at a sufficiently rapid rate to keep his infantry going. The only thing that saved the Allied armies was the indomitable pluck and valour of the British Tommy and the French Poilu. They could not be defeated, and after many futile attacks the enemy was forced to call a halt, just at the moment when Amiens appeared to be within his grasp. The Strategy He was confronted with the problem as that Failed to whether he should persist in his attacks between Arras and La Fere, or whether he should launch a new battle in the North, having the channel ports as his objective. It was essential for him that he should keep his forces as liquid and mobile as possible. It was fatal to allow the battle to relapse once more into a war of positions. There was one sector between La Bassee and Armentieres which suited his pur- pose, for he had possession of the Aubers Ridge as a jumping off point for his attack. A few miles behind his MAY, 1918. front line was the large and important city of Lille, where he would have no difficulty in concentrating his troops, his artillery and his supplies. Besides, this sector of the long line has never seen any offensive on a larger scale since the first year of the War. If he could rush our first systems of defence by surprise, he would immediately find himself in possession of good roads, and excellent lines of com- munication in the direction of Calais and Boulogne. An advance of 15 miles would threaten the communications of the Belgian Army and of all the British troops holding the line between Armentieres and the sea. It would also restore to him all the gains we purchased so dearly in the Ypres sector last year. Probably he counted upon the British reserves in the North being hurried down to the Somme for the protection of Amiens. Another considera- tion which must have influenced him was that if he succeeded in dealing a smashing blow to the British Army in this sector, he would undermine the confidence of people in this country in the leadership of General Foch. He would endeavour to make us think that General Foch had let us down, and thus he would be able to destroy the unity of the Allied command before it had had a chance of proving its effectiveness. In this manoeuvre the enemy is ably seconded by the scribes of the military and pacifist Press in this country, who spare no efforts to discredit the arrangements which have at last been made to secure unity of direction in the strategical conduct of the War. It was no surprise therefore when we learnt that the storm had suddenly broken out on this sector of the front. Fortunately the Allied wings stood firm, but in the centre the Portugese troops, after a gallant defence, were forced back by overwhelming numbers. The enemy overran Laventie, Merville, and Estares. Further North he carried Bailleul by storm, and advanced his line within a few miles of Hazebrouck. The great pressure at these points made a retirement further north imperative. Lessons of Perhaps it is too soon yet to apportion the Reverse the blame for the reverses of the last few weeks. This is not the time for re- crimination, but we cannot allow these lessons to pass by