a system-and it is in the conflict of such systems that rules come to be formulated. From this point of view, it might be best to say that a moraHty is a way of life or a movement and in that case the person who spoke in the name of morality would be neglecting to specify the movement he represented.'11 Ond nid rhyw fath o ail orau yw'r dulliau o fyw hyn, rhywbeth is na'r esboniad rhesymol ar y rhinweddau a ddisgwyl rhai gan athron- iaeth. Dywedodd Iris Murdoch, yn hollol gywir, mai'r esboniad ar y gobaith hwn yw'r gorbwyslais ar y cysylltiad rhwng rheolau a gweith- redoedd mewn moesoldeb. Arweinir athronwyr gan y gorbwyslais hwn i edrych ar safonau moesol fel dewisiadau gwahanol a wnawn ar sail yr un ffeithiau. Ond pe meddyliem am Ie delfrydau, chwedlau, a gweledigaethau mewn bywydau dynion, medd Miss Murdoch wrthym, a moral concept seems less like a movable and extensible ring laid down to cover a certain area of fact, and more like a total difference of Gestalt. We differ not only because we select different objects out of the same world but because we see differ- ent worlds.'12 Dyfynnodd Miss Murdoch ddywediad Wittgenstein, What has to be accepted, the given, is — so one could say-forms of life" a sylwodd, For purposes of analysis moral philosophers should remain at the level of the differences, taking the moral forms of life as given, and not try to get behind them to a single form."13 Y mae'r wers i'n pwnc ni yn amlwg. Rhaid i athronwyr wrthsefyll yr awydd a'r demtasiwn i ddarostwng y gwahanol fathau o bersonol- iaethau moesol i un ffurf arbennig. Nid oes y fath ffurf yn bod. Bangor. D. Z. PHILLIPS. llJohn Anderson "Art and Morality" Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Cyfrol XIX, Rhagfyr 3, 1941, tud. 255-256. Yn anffodus ni ailargraffwyd yr erthygl yn Studies in Empirical Philosophy. 12 Iris Murdoch "Vision and Choice in Morality," Arist. Soc. Proc, 1956, tud., 40-41. 13 ibid., tud., 57.