Marx's doctrines were placed under overwhelming pressure by the collapse of Commu- nism in Eastern Europe, so British Hegelianism was virtually destroyed by the experience of the First World War. Both strands of Hegelianism had implicit within them an emphasis on totality and a notion of the immanent rationality of history which was unable to bear the strain of the unpredictable unfolding of events. For the British Hegelians the state was the unstoppable vehicle of progress; for Marxist Hegelians it was the proletariat. Jones was caught in the same Hegelian bind as modem Marxists, and for that reason alone he is interesting. But he is also interesting in himself as a Welsh philosopher of distinction. Henry Jones was a pupil of Edward Caird, professor of moral philosophy at Glasgow University. Caird was an excellent scholar who wrote an outstanding book on Kant whose sole defect is that it is more partial to Hegel than Kant. Caird (who, in all other respects, was a very balanced judge) accepted the Hegelian view that Kant's critical view of reason ultimately represented an abdication of reason before the 'power of things'. In short, Caird lamented that Kant was insufficiently Idealist to accept that everything the mind received was ultimately thought. It is fair to assume that Jones shared Caird's view of Kant (having proof-read the book) and so accepted the general Hegelian view of the omnipotence of rational thought. The acceptance of the omnipo- tence of rational thought did not for Hegelians imply that humanity was in for an easy time of things; since rationality made itself explicit only after the unfolding of events, ascendancy and progress might well follow a convoluted and demanding path. Henry Jones, then, assumed a heavy burden in becoming a member of the dominant school in British philosophy in his time. The school was possibly at the height of its influence at the turn of the century when Jones himself held the chair of moral philoso- phy at Glasgow and many other Hegelians like Bradley, Bosanquet, McTaggart and Ritchie were in their prime. The prevailing view of British Hegelians appeared to be that Hegel had said most of what needed to be said in philosophy and what was required of subsequent philosophers was to develop the Hegelian framework along the right lines. Boucher and Vincent rightly make no claims as to the originality of Jones's thought but they do present him as a critical and flexible member of the Hegelian school. In some respects Jones's career represents the realization of a certain type of Welsh dream. He overcame extraordinary obstacles in passing from his lowly rural upbringing in Llangernyw, Denbighshire, to his chair at Glasgow. Jones left school at twelve only to return to full-time education again at eighteen when he became a student at Bangor Normal. After two years as a primary schoolteacher in Brynamman, he returned to full- time studies as the recipient of a scholarship at Glasgow University. His first teaching academic post was at Aberystwyth where he fell out with the first principal, Thomas Charles Edwards. Jones had some hopes of the principalship at the newly formed University College of North Wales in Bangor but then turned his attention north to Scot- land, where he became professor at St. Andrews before moving to Glasgow in 1894 and remained there until his death in 1922. Jones's relationship to his native country remained warm. He retained an interest in Wales and its institutions throughout his life, visiting regularly and from time to time intervening in the political affairs of the principality. The most remarkable of these